Showing posts with label Hornborg. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hornborg. Show all posts

Monday, December 23, 2013

Jevons paradox - why efficiency is a liar word


Young Karamoja boys herding goats and cows.

Recently, I visited the Moroto District in north-east Uganda, home of the (in)famous Karamajong pastoralist. These number half a million people and are isolated geographically, economically and politically, and are widely despised by their compatriots as violent and underdeveloped.  There have been efforts to settle the Karamajong in villages, get children to school and make them grow crops. However most of them are dependent on various development programs as well as food aid from the World Food Programme[1].

I visited a village where the normal kinds of development interventions were taking place. Most of them, typically, were not successful, e.g. only one child in this village of hundred children went to secondary school, the vegetable growing project had failed and most of the economy seemed to be gold mining and the brewing of sorghum beer. One intervention seemed to be successful; the construction of wood saving stoves. Such stoves are darlings of the development community and can save at least half of the firewood. Clearly a good thing; and they were in use. When I asked a woman if she now didn’t have to collect so much firewood every morning, she said, “oh, I collect the same amount of wood as before, I just sell the wood I don’t need”. This was ironic as the reason for the introduction of wood-saving stoves is to save trees, not generate income.  

This is one of many examples of Jevons paradox formulated by English economist William Stanley Jevons in his 1865 book The Coal Question. He observed that England's consumption of coal soared after James Watt introduced his coal-fired steam engine, which greatly improved the efficiency of Thomas Newcomen's earlier design. Watt's innovations made coal a more cost-effective power source, leading to the increased use of the steam engine in a wide range of industries. This in turn increased total coal consumption, even as the amount of coal required for any particular application fell. Jevons argued that improvements in fuel efficiency tend to increase, rather than decrease, fuel use: "It is a confusion of ideas to suppose that the economical use of fuel is equivalent to diminished consumption. The very contrary is the truth....no one must suppose that coal thus saved is spared-it is only saved from one use to be employed in others". Which seems to describe very accurately the effect of the wood-saving stove in Moroto.  

With the advent of petroleum, Jevons paradox fell into oblivion until the first oil price shock and the emerging environmental discourse[2] in the early 1970s. When you improve efficiency, say improve fuel efficiency in a car, it lead mainly to that people drive more as the cost goes down. Further, it is not only the same drivers that drive more, but more people buy a car and use it instead of going by foot, bicycle or train. On yet another level, the money saved on buying gasoline is used on some other activity which equally is resource demanding, e.g. building a bigger house, take a flight for holiday or just consume more “stuff”. This is referred to as a rebound effect. There are some that see evidence of that total resource consumption increases as a result of improved efficiency[3].

Jevons himself observed the effect also in other important factors of production, such as iron and labor. Even if rationalization can make workers redundant, it also increases the remaining workers’ salaries. This creates new demands and new employment opportunities. Those that made redundant are mostly productive in some other trade. Even if we see a lot of unemployment currently one must admit that, globally, the enormous gains in productivity have not resulted in widespread unemployment. To some extent, workers have reduced their work hours, but certainly not at all in parity with the increase of labor productivity. Overall, efficiency gains have not resulted in reduced hours of work, but in increased consumption.  

If we compare efficiency on various systems, e.g. in farming or food processing, it will in most cases show that the bigger and more technological advanced system is more efficient. Larger crop farms perform better financially, on average, than smaller farms. The larger farms don’t have higher revenue or yields per acre, but they simply have lower costs. As expressed by a report (Farm Size and the Organization of U.S. Crop Farming) from USDA: “larger farms appear to be able to realize more production per unit of labor and capital. These financial advantages have persisted over time, which suggests that shifts of production to larger crop farms will likely continue in the future.” Their yield per acres is mostly the same as on smaller farms but the research shows that farms with more than 2,000 acres spend 2.7 hours of work per acre of corn and have cost for equipment of $432, while a farmer with 100-249 acres will spend more than four times as much labor and double the amount for equipment per acre. In that sense the larger farms are more “efficient” or “productive”

The same goes for a farmer who drives his pickup to the farmer market compared to the lorries supplying the supermarkets; she will use more fuel and more machine capital per kg of goods. And embedded in the machine capital are many other resources, metals, more energy and other peoples’ work. But despite all this efficiency our society neither reduce the number of hours worked nor the resources used, not in total and not per capita. This is not even the case for societies that have moved towards more services, as agriculture and manufacturing declines. How come?

There are several ways of tackling this question. In an article[4] in the Journal of Cleaner Production, Blake Alcott looks critically at the claim that there is less impact from people employed in the service sector than in manufacturing. He says that this claim loses its validity if the full resource use of the workers is taken into account. If we only look at the labor it is quite evident that a hairdresser uses less resources per hour than a car-maker. But the barber will use his money earned for buying the same kind of stuff as the car-maker, so the resource use embedded in their work hours is more or less the same. Well, the car maker probably earns more, so in that sense she will use more resources. But, on the other hand, if the service job is in real estate or finances the service worker will earn more, and thus, on average use up more resources. With this perspective it is the total resource use for a human being that is of relevance and not how many barrels of oil he or she use in the work place.

Other see that it is mainly the inherent forces of capitalism, i.e. profit and capital accumulation, which inevitably leads to that efficiencies will be exchanged for expansion. John Bellamy Foster, Brett Clark and Richard York writes in the Monthly Review[5] that: “An economic system devoted to  profits, accumulation, and economic expansion without end will tend to use any efficiency gains or cost reductions to expand the overall scale of  production.... Conservation in the aggregate is impossible for capitalism, however much the out put /input ratio may be increased in the engineering of a given product. This is because all savings tend to spur further capital formation....”

There are also other perspectives. One is that much of the efficiency is not real at all. Ivan Illich showed already fifty years ago that if we included the embedded work in the car, roads, gasoline etc., the real speed of a person driving a car wasjust slightly quicker than walking. In addition to this Alf Hornborg points to that through factories and global specialization often is covering – and create – huge inequalities because of the skewed terms of trade where an hour of workin a rich country buys ten hours in a poor country. I believe all these perspectives have their grain of truth.
As yet another perspective, try this:

If we compare the resource use of big, highly mechanized farmer with a small scale farmer, we have ascertained that per kg harvested yield, the labor efficiency of the bigger farm is higher. This is also the case for use of most other resources for area unit. But what happens if we look at resource use per labor-hour? Then it is clear that the big farmer in his 400 hp tractor use an awful lot more resources than the farmer with a small tractor, or oxen, not to speak about the half a billion farmers still working with their own labor as the main resource. The same goes for the driver of the delivery truck to Walmart, he uses a lot more resources per hour than the farmer loading her pickup to drive to the market.

Now, you could say that nature doesn’t care about this discussion, if we are efficient per hour, per kg or per acre; nature only cares about the absolute use of resources or the total emissions. That is correct. But almost all people have a job of some kind, and in each job the same logic applies, i.e. that the more efficient each person is, he or she uses less resources per produced unit but more resources per hour of labor[6]. The total resource use in society is thus bound to increase despite of, or perhaps because of, increased labor efficiency. This is just another way of looking at the same things as Alcott does. He looks into the embedded consumption which follows a person regardless of occupation, while here I look more into embedded resource use per hour of work. After all, as long as we all continue to work so much, our total resource use is determined by how much resources we use at work and how much we use as consumers together.

The underlying driving force can still be the accumulation of capital as identified by Foster and colleagues, even if I see a more direct link to another aspect of the capitalist market economy; competition as a driver for reduction in labor costs per unit. Another driver is that people chose to continue working forty hours per week and thus exchange increase in labor productivity with increased consumption.  

Jevons had a problem to find a reasonable conclusion from his paradox. He said that “We have to make the momentous choice between brief but true greatness and longer continued mediocrity” in relation to the use of coal. His recommendation was more or less to continue with business as usual. I think what Jevons referred to as mediocrity is what is today called sustainability.

There are no free lunches. Or rather the problem is that we have got so many free lunches in the shape of “natural capital” that we have used “for free”, that we believe that we “have the right” to use so many resources, and that the lunch will be free also in the future. But it will not.



[1] There have been floods, fighting and a number of other reasons for their precarious situation, but the important thing in this article is not to give a complete picture of the fate of the Karamajong. That merits a separate article.
[2] Such as the Limits to Growth, from the Club of Rome.
[3] Jevons himself saw that for steam engines. After all the first ones were rather useless and were thus not used much. As their efficiency increased they spread all through the economy.
[4] Mill’s scissors: structural change and the natural-resource inputs to labor, Journal of Cleaner Production 21 (2012) 83-92
[5] Capitalism and the curse of energy efficiency: the Return of Jevons Paradox, Monthly Review, 2010/11/01
[6] It is likely that there are some exceptions to this, but I believe that they are just that, exceptions

Saturday, March 10, 2012

Technology is rarely neutral


This is a sad hoax, for industrial man no longer eats potatoes made from solar energy; now he eats potatoes partly made of oil. 
(Howard T. Odum, Environment, Power, and Society, 1971)


The Greeks knew the power of steam and built the first steam engine as a plaything; they even knew the principle behind electricity. Water toilets were developed in Egypt some 5000 years ago and were used by the Romans, but it took thousands of years before they came into common use. The wheel was known in Latin America, but was not used productively before Columbus. The first faxes were developed in the nineteenth century but it took another 100 years for them to become common.[1] Fuel cells, which are seen as technology for the future, have been around for more than 150 years, but never reached the stage of a technological breakthrough. The first steam engines in Sweden stood idle, collecting dust, mainly because they were not profitable and partly because there were no competent operators (Hård and Jamison 2005), a situation similar to that of a lot of technologies that are, mistakenly, introduced in developing countries today. All these examples show clearly that the existence or the knowledge of a technology doesn’t mean it will be used. 

Many reasons exist for why a technology is or is not used. The word technology comes from Greek techne, meaning ‘art’, and we know that a lot of technology was (and still is) used for pleasure, for the demonstration of power or for religion. Realms with a large population and a small elite whose wealth is based on extortion of the masses most likely developed very few productive innovations, the majority being developed to amuse and entertain the rulers. Therefore, technological development was very slow in the big agrarian empires.

War and conflict have been forceful drivers of innovation, comprising examples of the importance of government-supported innovation. The Egyptians knew of the wheel, yet their slaves used sledges to pull boulders for the pyramids. But the use of the wheel rapidly spread in its military application in the form of the chariot. One can also compare the spread of the saddle and the spur with the spread of the harness. The saddle and the spur were of critical military importance and gave a marked advantage to the armies using them, so they spread rapidly. The harness was mainly used for draught animals in farming and spread across the world very slowly (Lönnroth 1977). Modern examples of innovations with a military origin are pasteurization, the Internet and antibiotics. Communications is another area in which innovation was (and still is) very strong. Innovations in shipbuilding or navigation played a major role in determining which people would rule. The supple Viking ships could reach into narrow fjords and rivers and were key to the Viking expansion; later the cogs of the Hanseatic League took over, owing to greater capacity (Lönnroth 1977). Thus, societies that developed quicker or safer means of communication or those of higher capacity had a marked advantage over others. 

The Chinese emperors were sceptical to technological development as it threatened stability. The Japanese are another example. Japan first came in contact with guns in the sixteenth century. In the early seventeenth century, it produced more and better guns than any other country in the world. However, the samurai, the military nobility, felt threatened by this foreign invention and gradually managed to curb production and licensing. Ultimately production ceased altogether, and resumed only when the first American warships appeared in Japanese waters in 1853 (Diamond 1997). In France, the scythe was not allowed to replace the sickle for a long time because there were communal rights to graze cattle on stubble, the value of which would be lost if a scythe were used (Boserup 2005). 

Technology is not neutral. It serves the interest of the social group that develops it. With its symbolic power it supports the legitimizing ideology of society and the worldview it represents. Think of the steam engine or the space ship not to speak of the atomic bomb. Schiermeier et al. write that nuclear energy has ‘benefited from decades of expensive research, development and purchases subsidized by governments; without that boost it is hard to imagine that nuclear power would currently be in use’ (2008: 18). Technology has also enabled development of the modern city and the relative independence of its hinterland. The early cities were, with a few exceptions, built on the relationship with the surrounding agrarian landscape. A lot of production occurred in the farms and the economy of the city and its hinterland was interwoven. With the Industrial Revolution, the transport revolution and capitalism, cities could free themselves from ties to their hinterland for raw materials, labour and markets. Thus, workers in Manchester spun cotton from the United States, picked by African slaves, and sold the fabrics in India.  

Technology also creates or cements power relationships and patterns of exploitation in various ways. Mostly, technological developments lead to suppliers of raw materials getting a rough deal compared to those who use the products of a certain technology. This is the basis for accumulation of capital, for profit, in industrial processes where ‘raw materials + work + cost of production’ has a lower value than the product resulting from these inputs. The same holds true in international trade or in the international division of labour. Alf Hornborg (2009) goes as far as stating that technology in a fundamental way is about such price relationships and a tool for exploitation; there is no technological rationality separate from issues of distribution.


[1]            To soon be forgotten again. Young readers will probably have to look up ‘fax’ in Wikipedia to check what it is.

Monday, November 28, 2011

Money: The only way to assign value to anything is to sell it.


Adam Smith (1776) stated that labour is the real standard by which the value of commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared, and money is only a nominal price. How far we have gone in those 240 years! Today the notion that labour represent the real value would be seen as quaint or perhaps communist, even if Marx was the one that realised that through capitalism, labour is no longer a standard value, but a commodity to be bought and sold for profit. Money is like an alphabet with only one sign says Alf Hornborg (2010). That is the reason for why you can't communicate any meaning with money, anything more nuanced than a call to consume, i.e. to use up resources. In the market society the only way to assign a value to anything is to sell it, which means that things that are outside the market circulation almost by definition has no value. Well, reality is a bit more complex than that, we know that our personal relationships are not traded and we certainly enjoy them, and most people still enjoy many free pleasures, but policy makers are increasingly discussing access to those freebees, such as a forest, in terms of willingness-to-pay-for. 

In economics, there are attempts to add more "real" values to ecosystem services and assign costs to the depletion of natural and social capital as well as to pollution. However, in order to have an impact on "policy makers" all this has to be expressed in dollars, in money. It's like the system of bride prices or dowry, where you assign material values to the union of two people. But as little as a dowry is an indicator of love are the values assigned to ecosystem services an expression of their real values. With money as the determinant of value, we make nature a subsystem of the economy. That is one reason for why the efforts of valuing environmental services are not sufficient to re-direct our economy from the path of self-destruction - and why it even can be negative in the long run. A similar problem we have in the valuation of work. By definition, market prices are always "right". This serves as a justification of that a business leader earns 100 times as much as his workers, or that an worker in the rich countries are "worth" twenty times as much as a worker in a poor country or fifty times as much as a small-holder farmer. In this way, money obscures the reality, and justifies the logic of exploitation and inequality. In the short term, as measures to slow down or even reverse environmental destruction, assigning values to environmental services, and fees for their use, or assigning costs to pollution makes a lot of sense, exactly because it works within the capitalist economic paradigm. In the longer term though, we need to find other ways because ecologist can't do a better job of managing capitalism than economists. 

We can also discuss the economic system in ecological terms, in biophysical terms. This makes a lot of sense, at least for analytical purposes, because our economy is a subsystem of the physical system we live in. The idea is to instead of expression of the economic system in monetary values, it is expressed in "real" values, such as land use, labour, tons of minerals extracted. What comes out of that is certainly very interesting as it clearly exposes destruction of nature; increase in entropy as well as the social disparities. From this, there is of course a big step to implement a system whereby our current currency would be attached to one or more of such "real" values. In the end, you would have to select one parameter, like gold was such a parameter for a long period, and once you do that you would experience problems.

(extract from Garden Earth)

Thursday, April 28, 2011

The business plan of the factory is to produce externalities


To a very large extent, many of our industrial technologies are about producing "externalities". The industrial capitalist model extracts resources in distant places (destroying other peoples' nature and possibly livelihoods), it has workers do something with them and pay them only part of the added value, the cost of pollution is carried by the local communities, the cost of health care is footed by society, the cost of schooling the workers is covered by society etc. The products are sold at a profit and the waste is someone else's problem. Our natural and social "commons" are resource pools and dumping grounds for the factory. Those that are most successful in externalising their costs are the most successful. "The rationale of machine technology is to (locally) save and liberate time and space, but (crucially) at the expense of time and space consumed elsewhere in the social system" as summarized by Alf Hornborg (2006). When one realise this, one see that what economists are calling "externalities" as if they were some kind of mistake in the process, are part and parcel of the business plans that are behind factories. Of course, there are tools and machines that are producing very few externalities or where those externalities are very small. By and large, however, competition drives industries into increasing externalities. The most apparent example is re-location of factories, to the emerging economies, where salaries are lower and regulations laxer. Many more trends in modern manufacturing can be viewed with that perspective. There is always a counter-movement from society to pressurise industries to take care of those externalities, as they are indeed damaging.

Hornborg (2009) shows how the unequal exchange underlying machine technology can be exposed by measuring the net flows of biophysical resources such as energy, matter, embodied land (ecological footprints), or embodied labour. The mechanical ‘power’ of the machine is to a large extent also an expression of the economic and ideological ‘power’ through which it is sustained. Ultimately, what keeps our machines running are global terms of trade, where the poor get a raw deal. Like with so many other discussions it is hard to discern cause and effect. Is it technology, the machine, as such that creates this imbalance in power, or is the imbalance in power that skews the application of technology into favouring the powerful? I think that they are mutually reinforcing, like so many other issues. In the market place, it is clearly technologies - and organizational forms - that tilts the terms of trade in your favour that will survive. Technology has created the illusion that economic processes can "produce" resources; that we through technological and economic transformation of raw materials into consumer goods can make more resources available; for the price of a particular consumer good, we can buy more material than were used for the production of the good. This is also reflected in the extraction of added value from labour. The value (price) of a good is higher than the work embedded in it, after deduction of other costs, which means that the capitalist can buy more work. These are also the mechanism by which capitalism, technology and economic growth are intrinsically intertwined, and one more reasons for why sustainable capitalism is an oxymoron.


Hornborg, Alf 2006, Footprints in the cotton fields: The Industrial Revolution as time-space appropriation and environmental load displacement, Ecological Economics, Volume 59 Issue: 1, Pages: 74-81
Hornborg, Alf 2009, Zero-Sum World Challenges in Conceptualizing Environmental Load Displacement and Ecologically Unequal Exchange in the World-System, International Journal of Comparative Sociology Vol 50(3–4): 237–262